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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years dealing professionally with US military lawyers on matters
of the laws of war, I have often been struck by the following disjunction.
On the one hand, the public attitude of career US military lawyers who deal
with matters of the laws of war has typically been unapologetically lawyerly. By
that, I mean an attitude which is strongly professional, in the sense of
representing a client who happens to be the US government, deploying a body
of technical law in a technical and narrowly legal way. Consistent with this
markedly lawyerly attitude, the US military lawyer's legal language is strongly
declarative of the US military's realistic interest in the outcome. In his or her
view, the lawyer exists to shape in legal language the client's interests, whether
that be the continued use of landmines in the Korean peninsula or the illegality
of taking civilian hostages in the Iraq war. The language of the US military's
lawyers thus is typically a language that, while not devoid of moral concerns, is
more centrally concerned with protecting a technical legal result in technical legal
terms-lawyerly language for a lawyerly result-and thus protecting a client's
real interests. It is a language conspicuously devoid of references to an
underlying moral vision of the laws of war, a technical language with little to
indicate that a moral vision even exists in which this lawyerly language and
concern for client interests are embedded.
On the other hand, when I speak privately with US military lawyers, it is
abundantly evident that, almost to a person, they have a clear moral vision of the
meaning of the laws of war and why they are so important. In private, they are
almost always able and indeed happy to articulate how and why it is important
that their professional and public legal work be embedded within a moral
framework. Sometimes they draw inspiration from the particularly American law
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of war tradition of the Civil War jurist Frances Lieber and the "Lieber Code,"
which President Lincoln made applicable to Union armies.' At other times they
may draw on the theological traditions of the just war, or on early modern jurists
such as Grotius, or they may simply draw on the general tradition of the "laws
and customs of war"-which, by placing a soldier's killing and destruction
within the confines of law and honor, makes the profession of arms more than
mere killing. Yet this moral background is rarely articulated in public. By that I
mean that the moral underpinnings of the technical law are rarely articulated in
ways that give support to one conclusion of law over another; lawyers do not
appeal to those moral underpinnings as a source for interpreting and
understanding the technical law, and in my experience, the US law of war
policymakers do not explicitly appeal to those underpinnings to shape the laws
of war in new circumstances, such as the war on terror. This is often true even in
circumstances in which at least some outsiders like myself would have thought
that an appeal to that moral vision would give US positions much greater weight
on various topics concerning the laws of war: issues such as the International
Criminal Court, landmines, or "acceptable" collateral damage. Instead the
emphasis remains on narrow legal arguments conjoined with a claim that "this is
how we do it and this is good for the US," which is a distinctly non-moral
argument.
Yet something of the private moral vision does emerge, to be sure, amidst
the professional detachment. It is hard to describe, because it is not precisely an
analytic quality, not a form of legal argument, but rather an emotional affect
coloring the background. In my experience, it emerges not as a form of
argument, but rather as an emotional desire to find common ground with those
on the other side of the arguments over the laws of war, those who have already
claimed the moral high ground, a ground which US military lawyers feel privately
ought to be theirs--or, at least, a moral ground that they share. It expresses itself
as an oftentimes sentimental desire to please the other side, notwithstanding that
the legal positions do not permit it. It sometimes amounts to a desire among US
lawyers for an acknowledgment from everyone else that we are all on the side of
humanity despite the gap in our legal positions, and it results in a peculiar
disconnect between public legal positions and the emotional content of the
lawyering.
Realists in public, representing a client, and yet idealists in private, with a
certain amount of suppressed idealism spilling over into the emotions of
lawyering-this Article speculates on why that disjunction might exist, and
queries whether it is a good thing. Specifically, it urges that in matters of the laws
Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Amiies of the United States in the Field (Apr 24,
1863) (promulgated as General Orders No 100), in Dietrich Schindler and Jii Toman, eds,
The Laws ofArmed Conflicts 3 (Nijhoff 3d ed 1988).
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of war that spill over into public diplomacy, negotiations over changes and the
evolution of the laws of war, and controversial applications of the laws of war, it
is a large mistake for the US military legal establishment to believe that it can
ignore giving public articulation to the larger moral vision that ought to attend
and inform the laws of war. Ignoring the moral arguments is especially
dangerous when debates on the laws of war take place in the public eye; even
more so when the debates attend actual military conflicts. This is so, I suggest, in
part because those critical of US government positions in these matters-other
governments and nongovernmental human rights and humanitarian
organizations-capture the moral high ground because they unabashedly argue
from moral fundamentals, and do so directly and successfully to the public.2
This is not a call for US military lawyers to "spin" a moral vision that they
do not have. But in my experience, these lawyers do have a moral vision of the
laws of war, and it varies in both principle and application from the vision of
human rights and humanitarian organizations and other governments. It differs,
I suggest, on at least two fundamental principles. First, US military lawyers
acknowledge the importance of winning that comes with the moral point of view
of a democratic state that actually fights wars, rather than relying on the moral
point of view of states that no longer contemplate fighting war or humanitarian
or human rights organizations that have neither obligations of governance nor
of fighting; humanitarianism is an easy virtue to .proclaim if no one
fundamentally depends upon you for protection. Second, the vision of US
military lawyers depends upon a commitment to sovereign democratic
governance, whereas that of their opponents is often situated in an ideal of
liberal internationalism or supranational global governance. If US government
lawyers have such a vision, then they should be public about it. They should
forthrightly state it in the public eye. If others disagree with it or disagree about
what should result from it, they should say so, and by that means advance the
common moral vision of the laws of war-including, to be sure, the idea that
there are things the US should learn from the rest of the world.
This is a recipe, at its best, for open debate, and at its worst, for mere
argument and bad feeling. But being publicly clear on fundamental principles,
even at risk of rancor, is the only way for the US government to explain its
strong feelings on matters ranging from the International Criminal Court to its
policies on military commissions. It is neither strategically in the interest of the
US nor morally in the common global interest for US military lawyers to engage
with the laws of war as though moral underpinnings were not part and parcel of
2 See, for example, UNICEF Office of Emergency Programmes, UNICEF Mine Action Strategy
2002-2005 at 3, available online at <http://www.unicef.org/emerg/Unicef-mineaction_
strategy_2002_2005.pdf> (visited Sept 27, 2003).
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the inheritance which US military lawyers proudly and properly regard as the
"laws and customs of war."
II. MILITARY REALISTS VERSUS NGO IDEALISTS IN
NEGOTIATING THE OTTAWA CONVENTION BANNING
LANDMINES
US military lawyers' relatively bloodless articulation of the laws of war,
together with a sometimes touching eagerness to be counted among the "good
guys," contrasts strikingly with the public language of those with whom US
military lawyers often find themselves opposed in public controversy:
representatives of nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") such as Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, or, on occasion, the International
Committee of the Red Cross; lawyers and diplomats for other governments,
especially from the European Union and its members; and representatives from
United Nations entities, among others.
For NGOs and others and, as a consequence, for much of the international
media, articulating a moral vision of the laws of war is at the very center of
matters. Technical legal arguments are merely tools to that end, because the
audience is neither a court of law nor even lawyers, but instead the court of elite
international public opinion, as filtered through the media. Whether US military
lawyers and their client are "good guys" or "bad guys" depends merely on the
extent to which the US position matches that of the NGOs. In that regard,
NGOs are entirely unsentimental realists, and there is no room to "agree to
disagree" among the "good guys." For the moralizing NGOs, there is,
unfortunately, only adherence to a certain NGO-promulgated ideal of the laws
of war or excommunication from the ranks of the good. And since the NGOs
have no security interest to defend, the ultimate outcome of legal argument, for
them, is the moral vision from which they started, without any pressure to take
the real world into account. Unlike US military lawyers, a lawyer for an NGO is
able to aim technical legal arguments solely toward validating a pure, particular
moral vision of the "law," because that vision need make no concession either to
the realities of how an army fights, limited by logistics and technology, or to the
importance, as Michael Walzer put it, of winning.
One way of explaining the debate between the US military and the NGOs
who organized the international campaign to ban landmines-the first large-
scale contemporary campaign to result in a major new laws of war treaty, the
1997 Ottawa Convention banning landmines4 is as an example of the different
3 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustraions 109 (Basic
Books 3d ed 2000).
4 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 36 ILM 1507 (1997). My own sense of the
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ways in which the parties applied their differing moral visions to the laws of war.
The US, like other governments, took a long time to understand that the
movement was serious and had a chance of succeeding in creating a widely
ratified treaty. The US's attitude during the early years of the campaign was that
although it understood and sympathized with the humanitarian issues raised by
landmine use-indeed contributing monetarily very significantly to landmine
removal-the flat-out ban insisted upon by the NGO campaign was
unacceptable because it took no account either of the realities of fighting or of
the fact that the laws of war had accepted landmines as a legal weapon since
time immemorial. Moreover, in a kind of plea of outraged innocence, the US
insisted (quite unpersuasively, given its use of wide-dispersal air-delivered mines)
that its landmine use was "responsible," not indiscriminate, and hence US
practice could not be considered a problem. Moreover, the US argued, it would
solve the problem through technological fixes such as automatic self-destruct
mechanisms on the mines.
5
Positions advanced by US lawyers and diplomats were complicated,
inevitably, by vacillations by the lawyers' clients. These multiple clients included
the Clinton administration and all manner of different agencies within the State
Department and the Pentagon, weighing in toward one position or another.
Opposition to the ban treaty in the Pentagon was offset by support for it, at
least in principle, in parts of the Clinton administration and in Congress. These
conflicts produced a desire by the US to have it both ways-to be able to
support the ban treaty in principle while not being bound by it in practice. This
is a normal fact of life for counsel representing a client that is really a collection
of entities-signals are often crossed and confused. Yet it is one of the
fundamental reasons for the disjunction between US military lawyers' public and
private attitudes toward projecting a moral idea of the laws of war. It is hard to
project a moral ideal if you have multiple and conflicting clients, quite apart
from the problem of reconciling ideals with realities of war.
But in addition to client tensions, there is a second problem-an issue that
has to do with the fundamentals of lawyering and the role of the US military
lawyer. I have perceived, in my own experience, a seeming tendency of US
military lawyers to search for common ground with NGOs and other
negotiators-a desire to be seen as part of the good guys even while having their
own interpretations of the laws of war as well as the interests of a particular
client to defend. This tendency was visible throughout negotiations over the
intellectual history of the landmines ban campaign is found in Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa
Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-Governmental Ogani'ations and the Idea
of International Civil Sotiey, 11 Eur J Ind Law 91 (2000).
See Kenneth Anderson and Monica Schurtman, The United Nations Response to the Crisis of
Landmines in the Developing World, 36 Harv Intl L J 359, 367-68 (1995) (discussing the US
preference for technological self-destruct solution to landmines problem).
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landmines ban treaty with US military lawyers during the mid-1990s. The lawyers
seemed eager-indeed, sometimes seemingly desperate-to find some common
ground with the NGOs and some compromise language that would allow the
US to join the treaty. It seemed to me to go well beyond the vacillations of the
clients and the political desire of the Clinton administration to join the treaty
while not compromising its military interests. It reflected more than merely the
client's confused and contradictory desires but was, rather, a feature of the
fundamental approach of the US military lawyers. Beyond even their client's
wishes, the lanyers wanted to find a mutually satisfactory solution that would
show them, in the end, to be part of the "good guys." So much so, I sometimes
thought, that it blinded them to the no-compromise nature of the NGO
campaign. The US military lawyers seemed to think, far into the process, that it
was a negotiation, whereas on the fundamentals of the treaty-use, possession,
stockpiling, production, and transfer of landmines-the NGO movement would
sooner lose, or at least hold out for the long haul, than compromise or negotiate.
That experience brought me to see the tendency of US military lawyers to
seek common ground and the desire to be counted among the "good guys" as a
result of their implicit, emotional acceptance of the NGOs' position that the
NGOs, being pure and unsullied by "interests," were alone able to articulate the
ideal laws of war. What is implicit is that the laws of war are "owned" 6-in the
sense of who sets their terms, who interprets them authoritatively, who
pronounces on them with public legitimacy, who controls their evolution-not
by democratic states that actually fight wars, but instead by morally pure NGOs,
who are, so to speak, angelic by nature because they lack earthly interests and
temptations. Deviation from the position of the angels seemingly could never
result from an alternative, and possibly even morally superior, view of the ideal,
but instead could only be the ugly and morally unacknowledgeable realities of
fighting or else evidence of wickedness. There is a great deal more to be said-
much more than is usually said-about the assumption that NGOs are
somehow pure and without "interests." NGOs do indeed have interests, even if
they cannot all be measured in purely material terms.' But in part, the tendency
to seek common ground is, curiously, the flip side of the US military lawyer's
focus on the pragmatic realities of war fighting. If the lawyering approach is
ultimately one of pragmatically satisfying a military mission, then the lawyer
tends to try to find any compromise, no matter how conceptually inelegant or
awkward, because if it is possible to reach a win-win situation, treaty language
6 See Kenneth Anderson, Who Owns the Rudes of War?, NY Times 5 6 at 38 (Apr 13, 2003).
7 This summarizes a larger argument about NGOs and their self-conceptions of angelic,
indeed religious virtue. See Kenneth Anderson, Secular Esehatologies and Class Interests of the
Internafionalized New Class, in Carrie Gustafson and Peter Juviler, eds, Religion and Human
Rights. Competing Claims? 107 (ME Sharpe 1999).
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that at least in the short term everyone can live with that does not undermine the
military mission, then so much the better.
In many-indeed most-situations, that is an admirable approach to the
laws of war, because in many situations there are many military means that can
accomplish the same mission. Moreover, under pressure of humanitarian
concerns and humanitarian actors, technology can frequently be improved; the
remarkable improvements in targeting and precision weaponry that the United
States now possesses owe much indirectly to public pressure in a domestic
democracy. I do not mean to suggest that this pragmatism ought not to be a
core attitude of the military lawyer acting as negotiator-it should. But it has to
be understood that in some cases-the landmines treaty being an example-
such pragmatism cannot cope with a situation that is not fundamentally a
negotiation at all. In those situations, the client must make a decision about what
it wants, and it may well be the most significant task of the US military lawyer to
help the client confront the fact that it cannot have it all ways. In addition, the
US military lawyer cannot start from the assumption that the ideal of the laws of
war is necessarily articulated correctly or best by the NGOs, and that being one
of the "good guys" is defined by the posture of those negotiating, or dealing
through the media, on the opposite side from the US lawyers. In the end, the
military necessity of landmines in defense of Seoul, today, at least, remains
inescapable-that is both a military fact and also a moral obligation all its own.
Perhaps technology or politics or regime change could alter that equation in the
future, but it is not the factual reality, and not the moral reality, today.
Thus, for example, even when the US made clear that the Korean
peninsula landmines were the fundamental issue, the language used to defend
that position by US negotiators was, once again, oddly bloodless and lacking in
moral plainness, while at the same time oddly emotionally plaintive.8 Landmine
use in Korea was presented as a technically insurmountable military necessity, or
in similarly realistic language of military tactics. On no occasion of which I am
aware did anyone assert as a fundamental moral issue the obligation to protect
8 See, for example, US Department of Defense, DoD News Biefing: Tuesday, June 17, 1997-1:30
p.m. at 6, available online at <http://www.dod.gov/news/Jun1997/t06l71997_
t6l7dasd.html> (visited Sept 27, 2003). The NGO campaigners were almost certainly right,
however, that the US was not acting in good faith in presenting Korea as its fundamental
problem. They were convinced--correctly, in my view-that the Clinton administration,
never intended to give up the main use of landmines in the US weapons inventory-as part
of "mixed" anti-tank, anti-personnel remotely delivered systems, and that this was the real
issue for the Pentagon, not the static border "demarcation" minefields separating the Koreas.
In that regard, the NGO movement was right to reject any move to weaken the treaty to
accommodate the US on Korea as it would not have satisfied the US. On the other hand, I
am equally positive that even had the Korean peninsula been the only issue, the NGO
movement was sufficiently committed to a completely "pure" approach that it would still not
have accommodated the US within the actual treaty language.
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the civilians of Seoul and not to invite, through potentially destabilizing actions
such as unilaterally removing minefields, a North Korean response based on a
perception of weakness-possibly resulting in a war the evils of which would
far, far outstrip even the considerable good of the landmines treaty. I never
heard the protection of South Korea articulated as a moral obligation or moral
good which had to be set squarely against the evils of landmines. On the
contrary, US negotiators seemed to me wedded to a combination of morally deaf
realist argumentation combined with a pragmatic desire to find a compromise
even where it was plain that the nature of the process precluded compromise.
The NGOs were not interested in compromise; on the other hand, they had no
obligations to protect Seoul.
The point is not really a complicated one. US military lawyers adopted a
double approach: speaking in realist terms of essential military missions, on the
one hand, while seeking a compromise on the landmines treaty, on the other,
that would keep them in the camp of the virtuous and angelic as defined by the
ban campaign. But whether asserting essential military missions or seeking
pragmatic compromise, and although sympathetic to the ban campaign's moral
concerns, US lawyers always employed a language of interests, even when
delivering it in an emotional tone that suggested, "How can we prove we're
good guys too?" The NGOs, on the other hand, seized and held the moral high
ground from beginning to end by always representing the issue in stark moral
terms, and constantly asserting that their view of morality was the only one that
mattered. There were other moral considerations that could and should have
been presented, such as the moral obligation to protect civilians in South Korea,
but these were typically presented by the US military as technical military
mission issues, not as fundamental moral questions. It is admittedly not very
likely that, if the issue of the Koreas had been asserted as a fundamental moral
obligation not to endanger civilians, the NGO movement might have seen a
greater need to accommodate, at least for some period of time, in order to avoid
the moral and not merely practical problems of destabilization, otherwise known
as the risk of war, between the Koreas. But at the least the question of
unilaterally leaving a city of millions exposed should have been presented as a
moral question, because that is what it is. It is as much a moral issue as the plight
of landmine victims.
Such a moral debate would have been good for the Ottawa Convention.
After all, despite the admirable success of the treaty not only in achieving paper
ratifications, but in curtailing actual production, trade, and use of landmines, it
has seemingly reached the outer boundaries of adherence. The treaty is
universally adhered to by states that do not seriously contemplate having to fight
wars, whereas very few states that do contemplate having to fight wars have
signed on. Non-adherents include the US, the Russian Federation, and China-
most of the Security Council permanent members-as well as India, Pakistan,
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Israel, and most other Middle East nations. Moral absolutism on the part of the
NGO movement has altered forever how landmines are seen, and that
achievement should be honored. But it has also built a wall between war fighting
and non-war fighting nations with respect to the treaty that is not likely to be
dismantled soon and which in the long term is a serious stricture upon it. That
wall might not have become quite so unyielding had the arguments over such
things as a long-term transition away from landmines in fixed fields demarcating
international borders in the Koreas, for example, been presented not as purely
technical military questions or questions of interests, but as countervailing moral
arguments. It would have required that the US have acted, and be seen to act, in
good faith in saying the Korean mines were the issue and not a stalking-horse
for other landmine uses. Perhaps the mechanism might have been a side
agreement committing the US to a timetable on removal in South Korea rather
than accommodation within the treaty itself.9 But the only party who might
conceivably have done so, the US, did not.
III. A CLASH OF INTERESTS OR MORAL VISIONS IN
NEGOTIATING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?
The same pattern of US military lawyers asserting arguments of interests
against a broad and easily understood moral vision can be seen in the
negotiations and arguments over the International Criminal Court ("ICC"). But
this surface similarity is profoundly misleading. In the case of the ICC
negotiations, behind the surface facade of a US negotiating language of interests
and European-NGO language of lofty ideals, the negotiations themselves took
place in an atmosphere in which the US, appearances to the contrary,
fundamentally had no room to negotiate, while ICC proponents, appearances to
the contrary, thought they were negotiating with the US on pragmatic, realist
issues only to discover that the true issue was a non-negotiable issue of principle
from the very beginning.
Like the Ottawa Convention, the ICC is the product of an alliance between
NGOs and "like-minded" states, relying upon the good will of an international
media that is instinctively in favor of high-minded institutions that reflect a
preference for global governance. Once again, the campaigners' position
adopted a lofty moral high ground, at once easily visible, easily articulated, and
sentimentally appealing to the global middle classes and international media: a
single standard and an impartial global court to adjudicate serious war crimes
Indeed the Clinton administration did offer a vague plan to look for technological solutions
to the South Korean mines with the implicit hint that if it could find a suitable solution it
would implement it and then join the treaty. But no one took that very seriously, inside or
outside Washington, as it was evident that neither Clinton nor Gore was willing to buck the
Pentagon on any aspect of landmines.
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allegations that would otherwise go unadjudicated. No more "victor's justice"-
who could object to that?"° And once again, the US has been portrayed as
asserting positions based solely on its interests, indeed upon its most narrow and
parochial interests, in not trusting "impartial" outsiders to judge cases of war
crimes involving its own military personnel and in demanding special treatment
for its own on the nearly insulting ground that the world's sole superpower
deserves special license to set its own rules.
The question is how the US has made its own case through its lawyers,
military and otherwise, and diplomatic personnel. As in the landmines
negotiations, the governmental client-the Clinton Administration-gave wildly
mixed signals to its negotiators and to the rest of the world while the Rome
Statute (the ICC statute) was being negotiated. It asserted that the world's
"indispensable" power required special rules, or it would refuse to play the role
required of it as guarantor of global stability-seemingly requiring some kind of
opt-out provision for the US. At the same time, its negotiators worked endlessly
on the substantive definitions of crimes over which the ICC would have
jurisdiction-an exercise that made sense only if the US intended ever to be
bound by it-the result of which was a remarkably well-drafted criminal code.
The EU expended great effort seeking procedural fixes that would allow the US
to sign the treaty while not actually having its service personnel subject to it in
reality. The Clinton administration vacillated publicly and privately over whether
to join the treaty, and finally signed hours before President Clinton's term
ended. Subsequently, the Bush administration promptly "de-signed" the treaty-
a novel procedure in international law, aimed at sending a political signal that its
opposition was real.
But the difficulties went beyond a clash between hard-nosed American
interests and the sentimental moral vision of the ICC campaigners. The much
more fundamental problem was that the US government, as a client, refused to
acknowledge that its fundamental issue was a moral, not a practical, one-not a
matter of humanitarian morals in this case, but of political fundamentals and
10 I have argued strenuously elsewhere that victor's justice is sometimes the morally correct
position, and that neutrality is sometimes a morally dubious position, although sometimes
undeniably prudent. Was it right to be neutral in the struggle against the Nazis? Were the
world's neutrals morally superior or even equal to those who fought against Hitler? Would it
have been morally better to have turned the prosecution of Nazi war criminals over to the
neutrals who had declined to get involved, in order that it not be seen as victor's justice? That
would be pernicious nonsense. Under some circumstances, it seems to me, victor's justice is
precisely what justice requires, because it signifies that you have been willing to pay the price
in blood to achieve it, while those who stood aside from the fight have no moral standing
with regard to justice against evil at all. See Kenneth Anderson, Nurembeg Sensibili y: Te/ford
Taylor's Memoir of the Nurembeg Trials, 7 Harv Hum Rts J 281, 292 (Spring 1994), reviewing
Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nurembeg Trials; Anderson, Who Owns the Rules of War?, NY
Times § 6 at 41 (cited in note 6).
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constitutional morality. It was fundamentally a question of democratic
sovereignty. At the end of the day, the US would either subordinate its
constitutional structure to the discretion of a prosecutor outside of the US
constitutional system, or it would not. No amount of compromise language
could elide this problem. The Clinton administration could not bring itself to
admit publicly that sovereignty was the issue, rather than the quality of the
procedures or the drafting of the substantive criminal provisions.
This was so in no small part because the Clinton administration, judging
from the outside, was deeply divided among its policymakers over the question
of sovereignty. The Department of Defense, of course, was adamantly opposed
to the Rome Statute, and President Clinton, looking out partly for his partisan
interests and partly for those of Vice President Gore, was famously unwilling to
take on the military. But statements from Clinton himself and others since he
left office (especially when addressing European audiences) have indicated that
important players, including the then-president himself, sympathized deeply with
the European trend of giving up sovereignty to transnational actors. When the
ICC treaty came into force in 2001, Harold Koh, who had been Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, called it "an
international Marbury versus Madison moment""-the moment, in other
words, when precisely what so many human rights organizations had been
denying so strenuously 2 had come to pass: sovereign states really had become
subordinate entities in a global federal structure, at least with regards to war
crimes. Others-Madeline Albright seems to have been one-appeared to think
that if the superpower gave up sovereignty to a transnational actor, it effectively
gave it up to itself; because it was the superpower, the US could still have it all.
The net effect, however, of all these unresolved strands of ideology within the
client or, more precisely, among the clients, was that the Clinton administration
could not bring itself to decide that fundamental issue, or at least to announce a
single view.
As a consequence, the Clinton administration's lawyers and negotiators
were left in the position of having to negotiate as though all the other issues were
the true issues, whereas in fact they were always, no matter how crucial to the
functioning of the ICC, issues incidental to the fundamental question of
sovereignty. Moreover, the negotiators sometimes brought their own views to
the table. I do not mean to imply by this that they were nefarious-far from it.
Certain negotiators, such as the Ambassador for War Crimes, David Scheffer,
were chosen for the position precisely because they had points of view. The
11 Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Is Set to Renounce Its Role in Pact for World Tribunal, NY Times § 1 at 18
(May 5, 2002).
12 See, for example, William Zabel, A Court to Embrace, NY Times § 4 at 10 (Apr 15, 2001)
(letter to the editor).
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current president of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, then-New York University law
school professor Theodor Meron, was brought onto the negotiating team partly
because of his academic preeminence in the field of the laws of war, partly
because of his long and sympathetic international contacts, and partly because he
represented an important, honorable ideological camp within the Clinton
administration that firmly believed that joining the ICC was in the best interest
of the US and aligned with its moral compass, if certain questions about
jurisdiction, procedure, and substance could be worked out, and that the best
way to work them out was through negotiators who were unquestionably in
favor of the idea of an ICC.
Yet in the end, the issue of sovereignty could not be set aside, no matter
how it was papered over. It would have been far better had the question of US
participation in the ICC been openly debated in the first place, not as a matter of
special privileges for the superpower, nor as a matter of internal procedures or
the substance of the ICC, but instead as a question of fundamental sovereignty.
But when the issue of sovereignty was joined, even that question was redrawn as
a question of interest versus moral vision. When the question of sovereignty
arose in public debate-American neoconservatives made it the centerpiece of
argument within the US-NGO campaigners and their allied European states
succeeded, in the international public eye, in making that into "merely" a
question of interests, arguing that naturally, the US, being powerful, had an
"interest" in not giving up sovereignty. Sovereignty was equated with power, just
another interest that ought not to stand in the way of the "moral" vision of a
world governed, in matters of fundamental morality such as war crimes, by
transnational justice.
But of course there is another way to look at sovereignty, one which looks
to the self-determination and democratic self-governance of a political
community true to itself, to democratic sovereignty not as the expression of
power but rather as a moral vision of self-government. It is as much or more a
compelling moral vision as its rival, liberal internationalism and global
supranational governance, the highest ideals of the ICC campaigners. This moral
vision of sovereignty-sovereignty as an expression of a democratic moral
vision-was rarely asserted, as far as I am aware, by the US in its negotiations
over the ICC. And with good reason, insofar as the US wanted to continue to
believe that it could have it both ways-participate but not be bound. If it had
asserted that the moral vision of democratic sovereignty underlying the US
constitutional order precluded conceding powers to the ICC prosecutor, which
the rest of the negotiating states proposed to do, then the game was up. What
would be left for the US to negotiate? Yes, US negotiators improved the Rome
Statute immeasurably, especially in the substantive definitions and elements of
crimes. But that was necessarily a sideline to the fundamental moral question of
democratic sovereignty-or so it should have been.
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The failure of the client-the client, I emphasize, not the lawyers-to be
straight about its genuine bottom line and to recognize internally that its bottom
line was truly non-negotiable because it was a fundamental moral matter for the
US as a political community, led to a dismaying series of follies that account for
much of the ill will that the ICC process has garnered the US in recent years. To
be picturesque, the confusion in the US posture put its negotiators, including its
military lawyers, in the unenviable position of flirting for years with no actual
intention of going to the altar. European states took seriously US
representations that its objections were pragmatic, particular, and remediable
through negotiations; they made extraordinary concessions, as they saw it, to US
sensibilities in an effort to keep the US in the process. They did so hoping that if
they could only resolve this procedural issue or that, this substantive definition
or that, the US would run out of objections. In the end, the US would conclude
that its interests had been protected, and it could join the treaty."
Endless US objections ironically improved the Rome Statute. But in the
end, just as the NGO campaigners in the landmines negotiations were not really
willing to compromise anything important, the US was not really involved in a
negotiation either, although the confusion of its many clients within the US
government obscured that fact over and over again. The debate was not in the
end about interests. The moral value of democratic constitutional sovereignty
finally trumped all other considerations-and that should have been clear to the
US government from the beginning. The failure to see clearly that sovereignty
was a moral issue that went beyond practical considerations altogether left the
US endlessly playing the tease. No doubt many of the pro-ICC actors within the
Clinton administration knew this perfectly well but made a bet that they could
nonetheless create enough drift to pull the US along by inertia. Perhaps things
might have turned out differently with a Gore administration in 2000-but
perhaps not. It is also true that European governments, locked in a love affair of
their own with supranational governance and, compared to the US, lacking in
long, continuous traditions of democratic constitutional sovereignty, 14 were
equally unable to negotiate the fundamental conflict between supranational
governance and democratic sovereignty. But in the event, it was the US who
played the tease, dangling the possibility of its acceptance if only this or that
demand were met, while Europe allowed itself to be seduced time and again into
thinking this would be the final concession. European governments reacted to
the de-signing of the Rome Statute with all the vitriol of a lover spurned.
13 Not dissimilar, in other words, from the way in which France, for example, had protected its
interests by negotiating a seven year opt-out from the Rome Statute.
14 Conrad Black, Westward Look, the Land Is Brght, Spectator (London) 12 (July 15, 2000) ("Few
of [Europe's] political institutions... have any seniority or proven value.").
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IV. COMPETING MORAL VISIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR: THE
STATUS OF DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY AND
ARGUMENTS OVER ILLEGAL COMBATANCY
The lesson for US military lawyers negotiating laws of war treaties is plain,
even if they are unable to act upon it: if the client does not know its own mind
or speak with one voice, its lawyer-negotiators will not be able to do so either,
and the result will very likely be grave misunderstandings and bad blood at the
negotiating table. In the ICC negotiations, client confusion prevented the
lawyer-negotiators from asserting what was in fact the heart of the matter-a
moral vision of democratic constitutional sovereignty-and it obscured the
critical moral issue in a cloud of important, but finally collateral, pragmatic
details. Thus a notable tendency of US military lawyers, as we have observed in
both the landmine treaty and ICC negotiations, is to allow the terms of the
moral high ground to be set by the parties on the other side: NGOs and holier-
than-thou European governments who have no actual obligations to fight.
Sometimes that moral high ground is claimed with respect to the humanitarian
aspects of the laws of war themselves, as in the case of the debates over
landmines, while other times it is claimed with respect to still larger moral and
political visions-liberal internationalism versus democratic constitutional
sovereignty, as in the case of the ICC. The unfortunate pattern of US negotiators
in these matters is to allow the moral terrain to be defined publicly according to
moral ideals which may or may not accord with US views and to argue merely
over the realist details of what is, in the end, someone else's vision. It is
fundamentally the wrong approach, not merely because it leaves the US at a
disadvantage in negotiations, but far more profoundly because it gives tacit US
assent to moral visions which sometimes in fact it does not, and should not,
share.
Perhaps nowhere is the clash of ideals about the laws of war more evident
today than in the still-flaming debates over the US decision to treat various
detainees in the Afghanistan war as "unlawful combatants," and therefore
ineligible for the protections the Third Geneva Convention accords to prisoners
of war. The legal and textual arguments, debating the Third Geneva
Convention's definition of those entitled to prisoner of war status, have been
laid out in many articles and will not be rehearsed here."5 More importantly for
15 A good place to begin in the now voluminous literature is with three quite sharply
contrasting essays on the Military Tribunal Order: Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin
Laden and alQaeda Terrorists?: A .Qualified Defense of Militagy Commissions and United States Poliy on
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 Harv J L & Pub Poly 591 (Spring 2002); George P.
Fletcher, On Justice and War Contradictions in the Proposed Military Tribunals, 25 Harv J L & Pub
Poly 635 (Spring 2002); Diane F. Orentlicher and Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes
to War: Prosecuting Terrorists before Military Commissions, 25 Harv J L & Pub Poly 653 (2002).
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the present discussion is that in asserting that the US would treat these detainees
as unlawful combatants ineligible for Third Geneva Convention protections, the
Bush administration took steps toward publicly holding out a vision of the laws
of war that was more than merely a legalistic reading of the Geneva Conventions
or mere assertion of interests. At least on a few occasions-the occasions when
it was most publicly persuasive-it appealed directly to a moral vision of the
laws of war as the frame for its legal and realist arguments, by noting that a basic
moral principle of the laws of war is the protection of noncombatants. This
principle requires combatants to separate themselves from noncombatants
through uniforms or other identifying insignia and, more importantly, to
conduct themselves according the laws of war. In its view, neither al Qaeda nor
the Taliban met those requirements and therefore could not benefit from laws
of war created not only to protect legal combatants but also to create incentives
to follow the laws of war and penalties for failure to do so.
One may agree or disagree with the Bush administration's characterizations
of al Qaeda or the Taliban. Amnesty International ("Al") has taken the position
that the Taliban forces were forces of a government, hence entitled to Third
Geneva Convention privileges, and that al Qaeda in their midst were part of the
governmental forces of Afghanistan, entitled to the same protections. 6 Human
Rights Watch ("HRW") has taken the position that Taliban forces are entitled, as
government forces, to Third Geneva Convention protections, while some al
Qaeda forces might be as well, depending on the circumstances and on their
degree of integration into Taliban forces.'" Both Al and HRW agree that
determinations of individual status require individual judicial hearings-a view
with which I agree as a matter of sound policy, although not as a requirement of
law. As I have noted elsewhere, that is not literally what the language of the
Third Geneva Convention requires. 8 This is a legal point that neither Al nor
HRW have troubled themselves to address, secure in their ability to garner
media attention by claims that the Bush administration has acted lawlessly and
without regard to the Third Geneva Convention-disingenuously ignoring
legitimately conflicting interpretations of the Third Geneva Convention while
claiming that the Bush administration lawlessly ignores the Convention's text.
More germane is that the Bush administration and its lawyers have
demonstrated a willingness to enunciate a vision of the laws of war which does
16 See, for example, Amnesty International, Memorandum to the US Government on the Rights of
People in US Custody in Afghanistan and Guantinamo Bay 2, available online at
<http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidocpdf.nsf/Index/AMR510532002ENGLISH/$File/A
MR5105302.pdf> (visited Sept 17, 2003).
17 See, for example, letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to
Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor 2 (Jan 28, 2002), available online at
<http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/01/usO12802-1tr.pdf> (visited Sept 17, 2003).
18 Anderson, Who Owns the Rules of War?, NY Times § 6 at 41 (cited in note 6).
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not cede the moral high ground to organizations and states which have no
responsibilities for security or fighting. This vision is based firmly on the
fundamental distinction between combatant and noncombatant and legal and
illegal combatancy, with privileges or penalties attached to the respective
statuses. 9 The Bush administration has been far from consistent in articulating
this vision; indeed it initially asserted a legal view in which the laws of war were,
quite wrongly, disregarded, then scrambled to fit its views into the framework of
the Third Geneva Convention. It has missed many opportunities to reiterate the
fundamental morality of the legal versus illegal combatant distinction. It is not
evident, at least from the outside, that the administration yet understands that
one reason it has received relatively little criticism from the US media about the
detainees at Guantinamo, despite a flurry of critical reports from Al and other
human rights advocates, is that it forced the media to confront the issue at least
partly on the moral ground of the protection of noncombatants. Some
journalists, at least, were sufficiently educated in the issue's moral and legal
intricacies to be far more cautious than usual in parroting the criticisms of the
NGOs, whether or not they agreed with the administration. Surely it is this
articulation of the moral importance of noncombatant protection that has been
crucial in arguing against the International Committee of Red Cross ("ICRC"),
which has asserted that if the detainees are not covered by the Third Geneva
Convention, they thereby become protected as civilians under the Fourth
Geneva Convention, which confers, in some respects, even greater rights than
those accorded to prisoners of war.20 Only by asserting the moral principle of the
protection of noncombatants is it possible to note the perversity of the ICRC's
position: by abusing the laws of war, one loses prisoner of war protection but
gains the even better status of a civilian.
The US government came out of this debate better off than it otherwise
would have because it was willing, albeit tentatively and only partially, to assert
its own moral vision. Yet the assertion of this kind of moral vision, which gives
one's legal position public persuasiveness, cannot be effective if done merely as a
public relations device. If key political and legal officials, starting with the
Secretary of Defense, do not themselves fundamentally understand and believe
the moral claim, there is little possibility that others will believe it, either.
9 See, for example, US Department of Defense, DoD News Briefing-Secretay Rumsfeld and Gen
Myers, available online at <http://www.defenseink.mil/news/Mar2003/
t03202003_tO320sd.html> (visited Oct 3, 2003) (explaining affirmatively that defenders as
well as attackers have obligations to protect civilians and that the use of hostages and other
measures against civilians was a war crime).
20 See Oscar M. Uhler, et al, Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War 51 (International Committee of the Red Cross 1953) (Ronald Griffin
and C.W. Dumbleton, trans).
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Yet in my experience, US military lawyers and officials have a moral vision,
at least on basic matters such as protection of noncombatants. It is too rarely on
display, and it is far too rarely presented as the frame on which legal arguments
rest. Still, it is one which has animated their view of illegal combatants and their
refusal to agree, for the sake of smooth relations with erstwhile allies, to treat
illegal combatants as prisoners of war. Insisting that illegal combatancy carries
penalties has been diplomatically costly, but it is a cost of defending a certain
moral view of noncombatants. This vision of the requirement of legal
combatancy has a history in the US defense establishment that precedes the
Afghanistan war, the Iraq war, and the war on terror; it is fundamentally the
moral vision of the laws of war which has undergirded US opposition to 1977
Additional Protocol I 21-that is, that Protocol I immorally blurs the line between
combatant and noncombatant, to the very serious detriment of civilians. The
US is right to oppose such provisions of Protocol I, and it is a disgrace that the
leading human rights NGOs, supposed purveyors of "the" moral vision of the
laws of war, have so uncritically accepted the application of Protocol I without
regard for its lower threshold of civilian protections.
V. CONCLUSION
The conclusions of this speculative inquiry into the moral role of US
military lawyers in negotiating and propounding the United States's view of the
laws of war are necessarily, well, speculative. But the following may be
suggested:
First, moral visions matter in representing the position of the US on the
laws of war. They matter partly because that is the language of those with whom
the US must deal and negotiate on these matters, but above all because the laws
of war are grounded in moral visions of law and the just war. At the same time,
the content of the moral visions of the US and its interlocutors do not always
coincide, and differences matter. Sometimes there are differences because the
US faces moral considerations that other parties do not, such as the obligation to
fight and win wars, which is as much a moral question as it is a question of
realism. Other times the differences in moral vision arise because the US has a
different, and sometimes morally better and clearer, understanding of the basic
21 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (1949), and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) (1977), 16 ILM 1391 (hereinafter
Protocol 1).
22 See, for example, Ronald Reagan, Letter of Transmittal, 81 Am J Ind L 910, 911 (Oct 1987)
(informing the Senate of President Reagan's conclusion that Protocol I cannot be ratified).
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moral commitments of the laws of war, as in the case of the extraordinary moral
deficiencies of Protocol 1.23
Second, different issues raise different kinds of moral visions. We have seen
two in this Article. One has been about the nature of the laws of war themselves,
their humanitarian underpinnings and their relationship to the fundamental
combatant-noncombatant principle. This is an issue that goes to the heart of the
subject matter of US military lawyers, and on which they themselves have
developed both a legal practice and a moral vision. But another has been about
the nature of political community and its allegiances, the deepest question of
democracy and sovereignty.24 Because the principle of democratic constitutional
sovereignty is not, by its nature, special to the laws of war but is instead a
fundamental political commitment of political leaders, it is a matter on which US
representatives, including military lawyer-negotiators, absolutely must have clear,
unequivocal political signals from political leaders. In the matter of the ICC, it
scarcely needs repeating that unequivocal signals were sorely lacking.
Third, generalizing the last point, US military lawyers, in representing the
US, cannot be expected to present US positions in the framework of a moral
vision, whether of laws of war, democratic sovereignty, or anything else, unless
they know that they are properly expressing the vision of their client. It is in the
nature of the lawyer-client agency relationship, as well as the nature of
democratic politics, that statements regarding matters as deep as these contested
moral visions must come with the imprimatur of higher political authority. The
clients must convey a clear vision to their lawyers, and senior political authorities
must understand that there can be no compartmentalization of "legal" issues in
the laws of war from a moral and political standpoint. Senior political officials
need to spend time considering these issues. The formulation of them can be
handed off to lawyers, but their resolution-which may wind up being seen and
23 Sometimes, it is quite true, the US vision is wrong, as I would certainly say concerning the
refusal to grant individual hearings to Guanuinamo detainees, for it elevates a mere legal
literalism over the obvious intent of the Third Geneva Convention.
24 In fact, these two are related in a special way. liberal internationalism, as I have found in
discussions with many human rights advocates in Europe in recent months, is surprisingly-
surprisingly, to Americans anyway-unsympathetic to the just war tradition, even the secular
just war tradition as enunciated by Michael Walzer in his classic Just and Unjust Wars. This is
because liberal internationalism embraces the idea that war, and with it, the moral problems
addressed by just war theory, disappears in a global society which is seen as fundamentally
analogous to a politically settled domestic society-war becomes what the sovereign exercise
of violence is in a domestic society, simply police work and the arrest and detention of
criminals. If you accept the "domestic analogy" of liberal internationalism, then a tradition of
the laws of war based upon just war tradition becomes a holdover from a different era.
Certainly this was the attitude I found in Europe-a sharp hostility to the idea of a just war
tradition, for the precise reason that just war accepts the concept that some violence might
even constitute war.
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digested by millions of people watching the Secretary of Defense in a live
television briefing-necessarily involves consultation between lawyer and client.
Fourth, US military lawyers need to move beyond the practice of
conducting pragmatic, realist negotiations while seeking approval from the moral
arbiters among the NGOs and Europeans. The negotiating style in fundamental
laws of war matters needs to change; it need not become less realist, exactly, but
it should be informed by a realism far more grounded in an explicit, US-held
vision of the morality underlying the laws of war. US military lawyers need to
understand that they will never be counted as part of the "good guys" whenever
their views diverge-as, of necessity, they will-from what NGOs and de-
militarized European states think the law is and should be. It is a profound
mistake for the representatives of the US to hold a sort of emotional torch,
hoping to be let into a church from which they will always be, in some way,
excommunicated, because they represent an actor who must deal with power
and not merely abstract morality.
This is not, to be sure, an invitation to revel in being "bad guys." On the
contrary, it is a call to US military lawyers to frame their work explicitly within
their own moral vision, and not begin by conceding that the defensible moral
vision is that which is enunciated by anyone but the US government. The US
position may not always be the correct one. But to have confidence in one's
moral vision, it is necessary to be willing publicly to declare it, debate it, argue
over it with others, and be willing to see weaknesses as well as strengths in it.
That cannot happen unless the laws of war are publicly and explicitly framed by
the US and its representatives in far more morally visionary terms than they are
today.
The point is that the US government must be willing to put its vision of
the laws of war squarely on the table. It needs to regain a large amount of the
"ownership" of the laws of war and their development, and it can only do so
through the public enunciation of the larger moral frame into which the
developing law is set. The US needs to expose its vision to public view and
argument, and in so doing subject the visions of others, NGOs and other
countries, to like scrutiny and moral argument. It needs to authorize its
representatives, its military lawyers and other negotiators, to enunciate that
vision and argue for US positions within the boundaries of a moral vision that is
endorsed and accepted from the very top levels of the political and defense
establishment. The US needs to reclaim a central position in the shaping of the
laws of war-for they are being reshaped, in part, by the wars in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and the war on terror, not by treaty, but by practice, the practice of states.
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It is not enough that the US act a certain way; if it wants its practice to
emerge as the developing law of war, it must be willing to assert publicly its
practice as law. That requires placing it not only within the language of existing
treaties on the laws of war to which the US is a party, but also within the core
moral vision that military lawyers specially consider their jurisdiction, the so-
called laws and customs of war. The US needs to think about the development
of practice, custom, and customary laws of war in the long term, at senior levels
of the government, and understand that however abstract these issues might
seem to be, they suddenly become tangible, concrete, and monstrously real in
the instant of crisis. The senior, political, and civilian levels of government need
to think and make decisions about the content and development of a long-term
vision of the laws of war, and to authorize their legal representatives to assert
that vision in negotiations and dealings with others in the world.
To do so is a great inconvenience, surely, for busy senior public officials.
But the participation of the most senior civilian officials in the fundamental
formulation of how the US fights its wars with respect to law and morality is a
sine qua non of democratic sovereignty. Democracies hold political officials
accountable for the moral content of military actions. The laws of war are not
merely technical matters of law which can safely be left to the lawyers, nor can
the lawyers perform their function without the active input of senior officials in
establishing the fundamental moral content of the laws of war. Law, policy, and
public scrutiny of the laws of war are inextricably and permanently intertwined.
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